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HOME MONITORING AND SUDDEN
INFANT DEATH SYNDROME:
THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
Donald Eugene Theis*
Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS) is a leading cause of death
in infants. It stands number one for infants between the age of one
week and one year old.' Approximately 10,000 infants fall victim to
SIDS in the United States alone every year.' The estimated occurrence
of this disease entity is 2 to 3 per 1000 live births.' SIDS has drawn
political attention, as evidenced by Congress' enactment of the Sudden
Infant Death Syndrome Act of 1974.' Although intensive medical research has been going on for some time, the prevention of or cure for
SIDS remains a mystery.
One obstacle hampering a medical breakthrough in the area is the
absence of a determination of the cause of SIDS. The consensus definition given to SIDS is illustrative of the difficulty medical science is
facing in trying to solve this disease entity. The current definition for
SIDS is "the sudden death of any infant or young child, which is unexpected by history, and in which a thorough postmortem examination
fails to demonstrate an adequate cause for death." 5 Although this
definition is not very enlightening, medical experts had difficulty in
agreeing to it.6
*Associate, Eastman, Stichter, Smith & Bergman, Toledo, Ohio; A.B. Xavier
University, 1976; J.D. University of Michigan, 1979.
1. Guilleminault & Ariagno, Sudden Infant Death Syndrome, 13 BULL. EUROP.
PHYSIOPATH. REsp. 591 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 13 BULL. EUROP. PHYSIOPATH.].
2. Committee on Infant & Preschool Children, The Sudden Infant Death Syndrome, 50 PEDIATRICS 964 (1972); Bergman, Ray, Pomeroy, et al., Studies of the Sudden Infant Death Syndrome in King County, Washington: III. Epidemiology, 49
PEDIATRICS 860 (1972).
3. Stark, Mandell, & Taeusch, Close Encounters with SIDS, 61 PEDIATRICS 664
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Encounters]. It has also been stated that SIDS kills "1 out
of every 330 liveborn infants in every country every year." Staff memorandum from
Dorothy Kelly, M.D. (Massachusetts General Hospital).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 289(d), 300c-11 (1974).
5. 13 BULL EUROP. PHYSIOPATH., supra note 1, citing Beckwith, The Sudden Infant Death Syndrome, 3 CURR. PROB. PEDIATRICS 1 (1973). The definition originated
from the 1969 international conference held in Seattle, Washington. See, Bergman,
Beckwith, & Ray, Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (1970).
6. 13 BULL. EUROP. PHYSIOPATH. supra note 1.
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The definition is essentially a negative one. SIDS is identified by
relying on the absence of other possible causes of death. Thus, the
identification of SIDS is, in itself, a problem-no infant can be
positively identified as having SIDS until after death has occurred,
through a detailed autopsy.
Despite such formidable obstacles, patterns or tendencies about
SIDS are emerging from various studies. Reported findings concerning
SIDS include:
1) it is most apt to occur between the second and fourth month;7
2) most deaths are silent and are apparently related to the sleep
state;8
3) it is more likely to strike premature infants, lower economic
groups, and families who have had a prior experience with
SIDS; 9 and
4) 30-50% of the infants had mild infections at time of death."0
One study, the Kelly-Shannon-O'Connell (KSO) project," is the
focal point of this article. The KSO study involved the feasibility of
home monitoring of infants the researchers identified as being susceptible to SIDS. The study, its conclusions and recommendations have
not been totally accepted by all in the field." The purpose of this
treatise is not to either defend or criticize the KSO report, nor to advocate any particular treatment as being the 'cure' for SIDS.' 3 Rather,
7. Id.; Encounters, supra note 3; Bergman, Beckwith, & Ray, The Apnea
Mlonitor Business, 56 PEDIATRICS 1 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Beckwith). The majority of cases may, in fact, occur between four to sixteen weeks of age. Id.
8. 13 BULL. EUROP. PHYSIOPATH., supra note 1, at 592 (90-95% of SIDS infants
die during this period); Encounters, supra note 3, at 664; Beckwith, supra note 7, at 1;
Steinschneider, A Reexamination of "The Apnea Monitor Business," 56 PEDIATRICS
1, 3 (1976).

9. 13 BULL. EUROP. PHYSIOPATH., supra note 1, at 592; Encounters, supra note
3, at 664 (a 2% risk exists for those infants who had a sibling who died of
SIDS-multiple births also face a higher risk of SIDS); Beckwith, supra note 7, at 1.
10. 13 BULL. EUROP. PHYSIOPATH., supra note 1, at 592; Encounters, supra note
3, at 664; Beckwith, supra note 7, at 1 (no percentage is given here, but viral infection
is present in a significant number of cases).
11. Kelly, Shannon, & O'Connell, Care of Infants with Near-Miss Sudden Infant
Death Syndrome, 61 PEDIATRICS 511 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Care]. The study was
done under the auspices of Massachusetts General Hospital. The report was the
catalyst for this article.
12.
13.

See notes 38-54 infra.
The author likes to think that he is not so foolish as to take sides in this

medical controversy, especially with his limited knowledge regarding medicine.
Guilleminault and Ariagno, 13 BULL. EUROP. PHYSIOPATH., supra note 1, at 592, note
that at least 70 theories regarding SIDS have been proposed so far, and none has yet

been verified. The response given the KSO study further exemplifies the controversy
surrounding SIDS, with a number of people advocating monitoring, but with a cardiac
monitor rather than an apnea monitor. See notes 50-54 infra.
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the article will examine the various legal ramifications involved in
home monitoring of near-miss SIDS infants under the direction of a
hospital, similar to that advocated by the KSO study.
Two events make this inquiry timely. First, more and more
hospitals are planning to begin home monitoring programs." Second,
there is unconfirmed word of several lawsuits filed against pediatricians who did not recommend monitors for infants who later died,
presumably of SIDS.'" Thus, it appears that the medical field may find
itself in a "no win" situation. Either some kind of monitoring program will be established with potential liability for utilization of a
novel technique not yet generally accepted, or monitoring will be
foregone with potential liability for failure to monitor.
This article will first discuss the KSO study itself and the reaction it
has generated. An outline of a home monitoring program will be
sketched, setting forth what is involved in such a program. In particular, the possibility of applying strict liability in tort, warranty, and
negligence theory to a monitoring operation will be examined in depth.
Although strict liability and warranty theory have made some headway
in the medical field, negligence appears to be the proper yardstick for
measuring liability in SIDS cases.
I. KELLY-SHANNON-O'CONNELL STUDY

A. Introduction
The KSO study was intended to "evaluate the effectiveness of
home management of life-threatening apnea in infants with near-miss
sudden infant death syndrome."' 6 The study spanned a three year
period, from 1973-76, involving a total of 84 infants divided into three
groups.' 7 Prior to home monitoring, each infant went through a bat14. Hospitals either instituting such a program or considering it include hospitals
located in Stanford, Syracuse, Virginia, Maryland, Denver, New Orleans, Rochester,
Bridgeport and Hartford. Letter from Daniel C. Shannon, M.D. to Donald Theis (October 17, 1978).
15. Letter from Daniel C. Shannon, M.D. to Children's Hospital, Cincinnati
(April 28, 1978). The letter notes awareness of three such lawsuits. Research has failed
to turn up any other information regarding these lawsuits.
16. Care, supra note 11, at 511. Apnea is defined as a "temporary stopping of
breathing." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY (2nd Col. ed. 1972).

17. Sixty of the eighty-four infants in the project were referred to the Massachusetts General Hospital. All had been resuscitated from severe apnea. These sixty made
up the first two groups. Group I consisted of 35 infants who experienced an apneic
episode while presumably asleep. Group II was composed of the other 25 infants who
had an apneic episode while awake. Group III included 24 infants who had had prolonged sleep apnea, although no one in this group required resuscitation. Prolonged
sleep apnea was defined as "apnea lasting more than twenty seconds." Care, supra
note 11, at 511.
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tery of tests; the results of which were generally normal.II Parents were
instructed on the use of the apnea monitor" and in cardiopulmonary
resuscitation. They were also supplied with a self-inflating breathing
bag and either a Rendell-Baker or a black rubber mask."0
Monitoring continued on all infants until each went at least four
weeks without experiencing any apneic episode.' The average age at
which home monitoring was discontinued was 8.2 months for the first
two groups. Average time spent monitored by the machine was 5.6
months. The third group was off the monitor at an average age of 4.9
months, after averaging 4.6 months of monitoring. " Follow up time
after monitoring averaged two years.
B. Results
The results of this study revealed a high incidence of prolonged
apnea during sleep, following the initial episode. 3 Twenty-seven infants required the bag and mask resuscitation technique to terminate

18. The tests "included complete blood cell count; urinalysis; measurement of the
serum concentration of calcium, phosphate, magnesium, glucose, and amino acids,
and urine amino acids; chest and skull roentgenograms; 12-lead ECG; EEG; and a
12-hour pneumogram recording." Care, supra note 11, at 511-12.
Results of all initial laboratory, roentgenographic, and ECG evaluations were normal. The EEGs of two infants in group I showed hypoxic changes characterized
by slow background activity, interrupted by high-voltage delta waves, and one infant in group I and five infants in group II showed seizure activity characterized
by high voltage sharp waves.
Id.at 512.
19. Airshields' standard impedance type of monitor, AM 71-2 and RI 71-3, were
used because they are fairly simple to operate. Id.
20. The project procedures had parents set the apnea monitor alarm to sound
after the infant had an apneic episode of 20 seconds. Upon answering the alarm, they
were to check the infant for apnea and color change. If the infant was pale, immediate
stimulation was called for. If there was no color change, then the parents were to wait
10 seconds more before starting any stimulation. Stimulation was "any intervention
designed to activate respiration." Three types of stimulation were defined. Gentle
stimulation involved minimal shaking, short of waking the infant. Vigorous stimulation was shaking which did wake the infant. Bag and mask devices made up the last
type of stimulation, to be used only if the first two methods failed to cause the infant
to resume breathing. All apneic episodes and their resolution were recorded. Id.
21. The decision to end such monitoring also rested upon other factors. These included "the history of the initial episode, the results of the initial and subsequent
pneumograms, as well as the frequency and severity of apnea while being monitored."
Id.
22. Id.at 513.
23. Group I had a 88% incidence; Group II had 80%. Group III had a 100% incidence, but the definition of prolonged sleep apnea had already classified these infants
as such. Id.at 512. See note 17 supra.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol5/iss2/2
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an apnea episode." Four infants, all members of the first group, 5 died
during the study, resuscitation efforts notwithstanding. Regarding
these deaths, the study noted that
[T]he parents of three of these infants did not hear the monitor alarm
when if first sounded. In the three infants in whom autopsies were performed, no cause of death was found. A fourth infant, who originally
appeared to have suffered a near-miss episode of SIDS at the onset of
sleep, developed severe airway obstruction and was not able to be ventilated during a severely prolonged episode. 26
The conclusion, that respiratory stimulation was significant in avoiding
SIDS death, was based upon the fact that three of the infants had all
previously been resuscitated by ventilation alone many times "7 and
several times by their parents using the bag and mask. 8 The study,
however, hedged on this opinion by noting a possible alternative explanation for the deaths. It admitted that the three infants' "deaths
could also have been the result of asphyxia due to obstructive apnea,
which would not have been detected by the impedance monitor until
all respiratory effort had ceased." 2 9
As for the other infants, all but one remained free of further
apneic episodes following monitor termination. The excepted case required resuscitation for a period when the infant was 22 months of
age. These children were all still alive as of the time the KSO study was
published.3 0
C. Conclusions and Recommendations
Combining the first two groups, the study computed the mortality
rate to be only 6.6%."' This contrasts with earlier mortality rate
estimates ranging from 20% to 100%.3, Moreover, the study found
that the percentage of infants who required resuscitation during home
24. The breakdown into groups was: Group 1-17; Group 11-9; and Group
III-1. Id.
25. See generally note 17 supra, concerning the manner in which the groups were
established.
26. Id. at 513.
27. Id. at 514.
28. Id. at 513.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id., citing as authority Weitzman & Graziani, Sleep and the Sudden Infant

Deaths: A New Hypothesis, 1 ADV. SLEEP RES. 327 (1974); Steinschneider, Prolonged

Apnea and the Sudden Infant Death Syndrome: Clinical and Laboratory Observations, 50 PEDIATRICS 646 (1972); Stevens, Sudden Unexplained Deaths in Infancy, 110
AM. J. Dis. CHILD 243 (1965).
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monitoring, 43%, was similar to the earlier mortality rate estimates. 33
These results led to the conclusion that "cardiac arrhythmia is not
'3
the proximate cause of subsequent death in near-miss SIDS.1 '
Rather, the findings support the "hypothesis that death in patients
with near-miss SIDS results from respiratory arrest rather than from a
primary cardiac cause." 3 5
In finding a "significant risk of severe life-threatening apnea in infants who have experienced near-miss SIDS,"' ' the study
strongly recommend(ed) carefully supervised home monitoring for all infants who have had one spell requiring resuscitation-whether onset occurred when the infant was awake or asleep-since even those infants
whose initial episodes began while they were awake are at a substantial
risk of requiring bag and mask resuscitation ....(S)upervision of home
monitoring should include 24-hour availability of a medical, technical,
and counseling assistance. 7
The article concluded that most SIDS deaths could be avoided by such
a supervised home program, with parents trained in cardiopulmonary
resuscitation.
II. RESPONSE TO THE KSO PROJECT AND MONITORING IN GENERAL
Criticism concerning the study and its recommendations came
from three articles appearing in the same issue of Pediatrics that carried the KSO article. The dissatisfactions voiced in these commentaries
covered a spectrum of points including: 1) Not enough is known about
SIDS yet to undertake such a program; 2) There are shortcomings in
the study itself; 3) The type of apnea monitor used has deficiencies;
and 4) Four deaths occurred during the research.
In his commentary, Nicholas Nelson, M.D., 3 8 stated that the
33. The 43% was derived by comparing information regarding only groups I and
II. Group III infants were excluded from this calculation. Thus, of the 60 infants composing the first two groups, 26 required resuscitation, or 43%. Care, supra note 11, at
513.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 514.
36. Id.
37. Id. The importance of such supervision was buttressed by the fact that no
parent terminated the monitoring prematurely. The article further stressed the vital
role of such supervision noting that one parent refused monitoring under the hospital's
supervision, due to a prior bad experience in home monitoring. Evaluation of the infant revealed that the child had experienced near-miss SIDS and had prolonged sleep
apnea. This infant died of SIDS one week later.
38. Nelson, But Who Shall Monitor the Monitor?, 61 PEDIATRICS 663 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Monitor]. Dr. Nelson chaired the American Academy of
Pediatrics' Task Force on Prolonged Apnea, whose recommendations are given at
notes 51-54, infra. He is on the pediatrics staff at the Milton S. Hershey Medical
Center.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol5/iss2/2
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evidence relied on in the study simply did not justify advocating home
monitoring. Deficiencies in the study" and the fact that four infants
died during the course of research buttress his conclusion. The best
argument that can be made in favor of home monitoring, he noted, is
"the fact that it is 'the only (available) wheel in town' ,,,0 although "it
is a rather bent wheel.""' According to Dr. Nelson, emotions obscure
the facts in this area of medical research. As a result, the pressure on
medicine to "do something, anything!"'I The KSO study's recommendations are an end product of this pressure.
The commentary by Drs. Ann Stark, Frederick Mandell and H.
William Taeusch, Jr., takes a more positive view of the KSO study.
"Even allowing for some overdiagnosis on the part of justifiably anxious parents, this high risk of subsequent episodes makes it necessary
to offer some form of assistance."" 3 They favor the guidelines devel39. See note 42 infra.
40. Monitor, supra note 38, at 663.
41. Id. In hospital monitoring of cardiorespiratory activity is rejected as a possible alternative here as it is too costly in both financial and psychological terms.
42. Id. In preaching a more cautious restraint approach to SIDS, Dr. Nelson
refers to the four infant deaths as evidence that home monitoring is not the right approach. All four fatalities came from the highest risk group of infants. The 11 % mortality rate recorded for this group is "not impressively improved over that of similar
groups who were not monitored at home." Before such an extensive monitoring program be undertaken, a stronger causal basis must be established. The study failed to
establish this causal link.
Shortcomings regarding the operation of the study itself included the lack of detail
on distinguishing episodes which required resuscitation from those that did not; the little information given concerning the parents' emotional and financial costs; and the
method employed to identify infants as being near-miss SIDS. Dr. Nelson desired more
information concerning distinguishing resuscitated episodes from non-resuscitated
episodes as he noted the percent of infants requiring resuscitation varied significantly
between the groups. Dr. Nelson notes that the resuscitation required percentage was
49% for Group I infants ("sleep apnea" infants); 36% for Group II ("awake apnea");
and 4% for Group III ("prolonged sleep apnea"). Criticism was also directed at the
short-shrift treatment given the parental factor. "(T)he same signs and symptoms in a
given apneic infant may lead to resuscitative intervention by volatile parents that would
not have produced such a reaction in those more stoic." Id. at 664.
No information was given on the emotional or financial cost to the parents and
their families. Mentioning the death of the infant whose parent refused supervised
monitoring does raise the parental anxiety question. So too, however, do the three infant fatalities the study attributes to late parental response to the monitor alarm.
Nothing, though, was said concerning the parents of these infants. Id.
Dr. Nelson calculated the 11 % mortality rate by considering only the infants in
Group I, those who experienced an apneic episode while presumably asleep. Thus, his
denominator here is 35. The KSO study concluded the mortality rate to be 6.6%-a
result based upon combining both Group I and II. Thus, the study's denominator was
60. Group II infants were those who had an apneic episode while awake. See note 17,
supra.
43. Encounters, supra note 3, at 664. Drs. Stark, Mandell and Taeusch, Jr. are
associated with the Department of Pediatrics at Children's Hospital Medical Center,
Published by eCommons, 1980
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oped by the American Academy of Pediatrics." Disappointment with
the study rests not with the idea of home monitoring, but with using
prolonged apnea to identify near-miss SIDS infants. They note that
monitoring, "even if 100% effective, affects only a small proportion
of infants at risk for SIDS because only 5 % of infants with SIDS have
a history of prolonged apnea;'5 the majority of deaths are indeed unexpected.' ,6 Little good is done by an effective course of treatment if
one cannot identify the vast majority of infants to be treated except
through death.
Difficulties with the type of apnea monitor used centered upon two
concerns. The first one involves the questionable reliability of the
machine. The second pertains to the type of apnea detected by the
monitor used in the study and the type of apnea it does not detect. The
loss of four infants lends significance to this point.
The reliability of the standard impedance apnea monitor is questioned at least to the extent that such monitors have been abandoned
in many life support units.' 7 Its ineffectiveness in intensive care
nurseries is also considered significant. If specially trained nurses on
eight-hour shifts miss nearly 40% of apneic spells in an intensive care
setting,' 8 it is reasonable to expect that parents on 24-hour shifts, seven
days a week, for several months will not do as well.' 9 An adequate
monitor for home use has simply not yet been developed."
The impedance monitors used in the study detect respiratory movement. 5 ' Such monitors do not detect airway obstructive apnea, a possible significant factor in SIDS. 2 The reason for this is that the imand Boston Hospital for Women. Dr. Mandell also served as a member of the
American Academy of Pediatrics' Task Force on Prolonged Apnea.
44. Id. The American Academy of Pediatrics' guidelines are treated at notes 56-58
and accompanying text, infra.
45. Id., citing BECKWITH, J., THE SUDDEN INFANT DEATH SYNDROME (publication (HSA) 75-5137, Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare (1975)).

46. Encounters, supra note 3, at 664.
47. Monitor, supra note 38, at 663.
48. Commentaries, False Alarms in the Nursery, 61 Pediatrics 665 (1978), citing
Stein & Shannon, The Pediatric Pneumogram: A New Method for Detecting and
Quantitating Apnea in Infants, 55 Pediatrics 599 (1975), and Peabody, Gregory, &
Wills, Failure of Conventional Respiratory Monitoring to Detect Hypoxemia, 11
Pediatrics Res. 539 (1977) [hereinafter cited as False Alarms].
49. False Alarms, supra note 48, at 665.
50. Encounters, supra note 3, at 665, noting that the KSO study and the
American Academy of Pediatrics hold the same view.
51.

The apnea monitors used were Airshields' standard impedance type, AM 71-2

and RI 71-3. Care, supra note 11, at 512.
52. Monitor, supra note 38, at 663; Encounters, supra note 3, at 665; False
Alarms, supra note 48, at 666. The KSO study also noted the possibility that the four
deaths could have been due to upper airway or obstructive apnea. The study did state

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol5/iss2/2
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pedance monitors report on respiratory efforts and such efforts continue against a complete airway obstruction." All three commentaries
remark that the four deaths may have been attributed to an airway
obstruction. The idea is presented that a different monitor, the cardiac
monitor, may well be better suited to the task.5 ' The cardiac monitor
does not rely on apnea to trigger its alarm, but is designed to detect
bradycardia."
The task force of the American Academy of Pediatrics on prolonged apnea 6 released its report in the same journal carrying the KSO
article and the commentaries. The report's recommendations included:
1) 24-hour surveillance of prolonged apnea infants, with appropriate
settings for such observation including properly staffed hospitals and
infant homes; 2) the importance of skilled caregivers, "trained in infant cardiopulmonary resuscitation and provided with continuing
medical, technical, and psychosocial support"; and 3) availability of
relief personnel in home surveillance situations. Although the report
did not specifically endorse monitors, it did note that "electronic or
other monitors of the heart or respiratory rate may be useful adjuncts
in 24-hour surveillance, but should be used only under medical supervision."'" The report did not express any preference between apnea
monitors and cardiac monitors. It recognized both types of monitors
have their shortcomings and no consensus was reached."
that one of the infants who died did develop severe airway obstruction at the onset of
sleep.
53. Encounters, supra note 3, at 665. Such monitors do not sense airflow.
Monitor, supra note 38, at 663.
54. Monitor, supra note 38, at 663.
55. Id. Bradycardia is the term given to a slow or retarded heart rate. One trait of
an airway obstructive apnea is a rapid drop in the heart rate, which a cardiac monitor
would detect.
In a follow up report, Drs. Kelly and Shannon restate their support for the apnea
monitor. They do say a cardiac monitor should be used if the child has a history of
obstructive apnea or the infant later develops obstructive apnea (which is rare). The
Management of Apnea in Infancy (unpublished manuscript). See notes 59-61 infra.
56. Task Force on Prolonged Apnea, American Academy of Pediatrics, Prolonged Apnea, 61 PEDIATRICS 651 (1978). Panel members were Nicholas M. Nelson,
M.D., Chairman; John P. Connelly, M.D.; Selina R. Deitch, M.D., M.P.H.; Donald
V. Eitzman, M.D.; David B. Friedman, M.D.; Warren Guntheroth, M.D.; Laura S.
Hillman, M.D.; Joan E. Hedgmen, M.D.; Dorothy H. Kelly, M.D.; Frederick
Mandell, M.D.; Charles Q. McClelland, M.D.; Daniel C. Shannon, M.D.; Alfred
Steinschneider, M.D; Marie Valdes-Dapena, M.D.
57. Id.
58. Id. The report also expressed great concern over the psychological impact
such surveillance has on the family, whether or not monitors are used. Individual
evaluation of each family member was stressed before embarking upon any specific
method of treatment. Being aware of the infant's normal development, as well as the

Published by eCommons, 1980
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A follow up home monitoring study at the Massachusetts General
Hospital essentially confirmed the conclusions of the KSO study in
recommending "that all infants who have experienced a near miss
episode for which no etiology was found, be treated with a monitor at
home and that their parents be trained in cardiopulmonary resuscitation.""' The apnea monitor was preferred over the cardiac monitor,
although the cardiac monitor was used on infants either having a
history of obstructive apnea or later developing such an apnea. Parental anxiety was found to decrease once home monitoring began. The
reason given for this change was that parents found that most infants
6
resumed breathing on their own or after only minimal intervention. 0
The support system was also given much of the credit for minimizing
61
parental worries.
emotional and physical needs of siblings also merited attention. Community resources
should also be drawn upon wherever appropriate.
Despite recommending such an expansive method of treatment, the report contained two caveats. First, it was noted that because "a definitive causal relation between prolonged apnea and SIDS has not been established, continuing research in these
areas is essential." Id. Second, "a successful outcome for every baby with prolonged
apnea cannot be guaranteed, despite continuous surveillance (with or without
monitors) and appropriate intervention." Id. See generally Spiro, CreatingPatients,61
PEDIATRICS 652 (1978), taken from, Visceral Viewpoints: Pain and Perfectionism: The
Physician and the Pain Patient, 294 N. Eng. J. Med. 829 (1976).
59. The Management of Apnea in Infancy at 7 (unpublished manuscript).
Although no author or authors are listed, it is believed this article was written by either
Drs. Kelly or Shannon or both. The follow up report took place at the Massachusetts
General Hospital; Kathleen O'Connell, one of the authors of the KSO article, is given
credit for her contribution to this article; and finally, the article came as part of a
package of materials Dr. Shannon has graciously sent this author.
60. Id. An earlier study on monitors and parental anxiety reached the same conclusion-the availability of monitoring equipment appeared to decrease such anxieties.
"Faced with a tangible risk of a severe or potentially fatal episode, the parents did
cope effectively with the imperfect mode of treatment offered and were overwhelmingly grateful for the availability of an instrument that made it possible for them to
care for their infants at home." Steinschneider, A Reexamination of "The Apnea
Monitor Business," 58 PEDIATRICS 1 (1976).
61. Although this report favored apnea monitors over cardiac monitors, the controversy is far from over. The inability of apnea monitors to detect upper airway apnea
is the pivotal factor for a number of researchers to state a preference for the cardiac
monitor. Steinschneider, supra note 60, at 2. Dr. Abraham Bergman, once an opponent of monitoring, now favors the task force recommendations on prolonged apnea.
However, he favors using only cardiac monitors as a supplementary aid to an adequate
support system. Letter from Abraham Bergman, M.D. to Donald Theis (October 16,
1978). Finally, an earlier study also concluded that cardiac monitors were preferable
over apnea monitors. This report noted the importance in distinguishing the different
types of apnea as "the most severe and longest episodes of bradycardia were always
associated with upper airway or mixed apneas." Guilleminault, Peraita, Souquet &
Dement, Apnea During Sleep in Infant: Possible Relationship with Sudden Infant
Death Syndrome, 190 Science 677, 679 (1975) (mixed apnea is a combination of upper
airway and central apnea which an impedance monitor would detect).
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III. PROTOTYPE HOME MONITORING PROGRAM
A typical hospital-home monitoring program can be divided into

three components, 2 consisting of: (1) a training program concerning
the monitor, accessories, and cardiopulmonary resuscitation; (2) services involved in making the home setting conducive to monitoring;
and (3) a support system minimizing parental and family stress in-

herent in home monitoring.
Equipment involved in home monitoring, the use of which would

require explanation and training, includes the monitor itself, wires,
leads, electrodes, electrode belts, intercoms or amplifiers, and a power
failure alarm. The in-hospital teaching program would also cover in-

fant cardiopulmonary resuscitation and bag and mask resuscitation.6 3
Proper arrangement of the infant's room is one subject coming
within the second subpart of the prototype home monitoring system.

Efficiency and safety are the keywords. Relevant considerations include securing the machine out of the reach of other children, placement of the intercom or amplifier and assuring ready access to the bag
and mask, telephone, and the monitored infant. Development of set
procedures to deal with problems which might arise in the course of
monitoring, including situations which call for contacting the hospital
or physicians, would come under this subtopic.
The support system involves the greatest expenditure of hospital
time, personnel and resources. The reason for this is simple.
"[M]onitoring demands a lot of parents and siblings, and often becomes a major disruption in the family's daily life. Most parents feel
that the pros of monitoring far outweigh the cons, but ... the whole
endeavor can seriously threaten family stability unless accompanied by

an elaborate support system.""
62. This information is derived from the KSO study, a follow-up report, the task
force report on prolonged apnea, and materials obtained from Dr. Shannon relating to
the home monitoring program run by the Massachusetts General Hospital [MGH]. The
purpose here is to suggest what is involved in a monitoring program. The prototype
program which follows is not identical in every respect to that run by MGH. Any
variation between the prototype and that of MGH's program is, in no way, to be construed as a judgment upon MGH's program.
63. The follow-up report indicates the in-hospital training program generally requires three days. MGH's home monitoring program components mention that the initial teaching involves a program nurse for approximately six hours and a video
teaching film.
64. Staff memorandum from Dorothy Kelly, M.D. (Mass. Gen. Hospital).
Hospital involvement here would include the availability of a doctor on a 24-hour
basis, a technician and a monitor repairman. Other facets of a support system would
take in routine home or hospital visits or both; and routine pneumograms when the infant experiences difficulty. Such visits and pneumograms would continue through any
follow-up period after termination of monitoring by machine. Massachusetts General
Hospital-Outline of Teaching Program for Home Monitoring (unpublished).
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Hospital assistance on the psychosocial level may include a number
of activities. Such aid might involve parental contact by phone and
routine home visits,6" coordination of collateral services such as a
psychiatrist, assisting local SIDS organizations, ensuring parent-toparent communication by those having similar interests and experiences, and ensuring availability of trained nurses to temporarily
relieve parents of monitoring duties."
IV. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
Hospitals and staff participating in a home monitoring program
may be subjected to liability for infant deaths under three theories:
negligence; warranty; and strict liability in tort. Professional
negligence or malpractice in breach of the duty of care demanded of a
hospital and its associates, is by far the most common basis for
recovery in medical situations. Although the trend in the law has been
toward the expansion of warranty and strict liability, the policies
underlying these two priniciples do not, in this author's opinion,
justify their application in the context of SIDS home monitoring.
Negligence is the appropriate legal standard for determining liability
concerning a hospital's home monitoring program.
A. Negligence
Negligence involves the breach of a duty of care established by
law. 67 A hospital's standard of care requires the "exercise of that
65. Home visits to minimize stress may include visits merely to pick up records the
parents have been keeping regarding monitoring. Such casual visits by hospital personnel may have a marked beneficial effect.
66. MGH's program materials suggest that a nurse relieve the parents for an
8-hour period every other week; otherwise babysitting may present a problem to
parents of infants being monitored because a babysitter must understand and operate
the monitor and CPR. Nonetheless, such breaks are necessary in keeping stress at a
minimum. Also, having parents of monitored infants meet together can serve a twofold purpose. Not only can such parents share experiences and tips, but they can also
share babysitting duties with each other.
Other considerations under the support service category include continuing education through workshops and publications, and obtaining relief from the financial
burden of monitoring. The cost of monitoring is high. A breakdown of expenses
would cover equipment such as the monitor, power failure alarm, intercom system,
and electrode belt; pneumogran tests as scheduled and as ordered; and services involving the initial instruction, the installation of equipment, the availability of people for
the support system and follow-up process (social workers, psychiatrists, etc.). Expenses
in excess of $2500, an estimate of costs for home monitoring by MGH, can be anticipated. The actual figure will vary, depending upon the tests and frequency of
testing called for in each individual case.
67. Liability for negligence requires the establishment of four elements: (1) a legal
duty must be owed to the injured party by the party to be held liable; (2) there must be
a failure in such duty; (3) actual loss or injury must be incurred; and (4) a reasonably
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol5/iss2/2
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degree of care, skill, and diligence used by hospitals generally in the
community." 6 The amount of care required to meet this standard
varies with the circumstances, with a higher degree of care required in
dealing with children. 69 The hospital's duty also includes the exercise
of reasonable care in selection, inspection and maintenance of equipment and facilities. 70
close causal connection (proximate cause) must be found between the conduct and injury. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 30, 143-44 (4th Ed. 1971).

68. Alden v. Providence Hospital, 382 F.2d 163 (D.C. Cir. 1967); 40 AM. JUR. 2d
Hospitals and Asylums § 26 (1968).
This article assumes that the hospital implementing a home monitoring program
has no general immunity from tort liability. The issues of charitable and sovereign immunities are ignored. Because a number of jurisdictions still recognize such immunities, the status of a particular hospital as a private, public, or charitable institution is significant. Information on immunity can be found at Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 203
(1952) (sovereign immunity), and Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 29 (1952) (charitable
immunity).
The phrase "generally in the community," regarding a hospital's duty of care,
refers to the same or a similar community or locality or area as that of the hospital in
question. PROSSER, supra note 67, § 32 at 164. See, e.g., Schwartz v. United States,
226 F. Supp. 84 (D.D.C. 1964) (area); Carrigan v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 104 N.H.
73, 178 A.2d 502 (1962) (similar localities). Nonetheless, there is pressure to have a national or general standard established rather than a geographic one. See, e.g., Darling
v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 50 Ill. App. 2d 253, 200 N.E.2d 149,
aff'd, 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 256 (1964); Dickinson v. Mailliard, 175 N.W.2d 588
(Iowa 1970); Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 431 P.2d 973 (1967) (locality is
only one factor in determining degree of care); Annot., 36 A.L.R.3d 451 (1971). Prosser favors the trend toward a general standard. Today's revolution in technology and
communication makes the locality comparison unnecessary. PROSSER, supra note 67, §
32 at 164.
Realistically, a national standard is the only practical standard applicable to
hospitals with home monitoring operations. The danger of SIDS (through prolonged
apnea) is sufficiently low and the commitment of resources is sufficiently high to require limitation of the number of home monitoring programs in any given area to one
or two hospitals. Further, application of a national standard should have no effect
upon the viability of such programs.
It is also unlikely that the entire practice of establishing or refusing to establish
some monitoring would be declared negligent, in a manner similar to Helling v. Carey,
83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974), where the existing medical practice of only giving glaucoma tests to patients over forty was determined to be a basis for liability.
Significant differences exist between a home monitoring program and the former
custom regarding glaucoma examinations. A glaucoma test is easy and simple to give;
the test is reliable and accepted in medical circles. In contrast, a hospital home
monitoring program concerns a medical subject that is in a state of flux, where a
definite medical cause has yet to be established.
69. Steeves v. United States, 294 F. Supp. 446 (S.D.S.C. 1968); 40 AM. JUR. 2d
Hospitals and Asylums § 26 (1968).
70. Equipment should be reasonably fit for uses and purposes intended in a given
situation. A hospital may be held liable for furnishing defective equipment to a patient
who incurs harm as a result of such equipment. Weeks v. Latter-Day Saints Hosp., 418
F.2d 1035 (10th Cir. 1969), Delling v. Lake View Hosp. and Training School, 310 Ill.
App. 155, 33 N.E.2d 915 (1941).
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It is the duty of physicians to "exercise reasonable care in what
they do and possess a standard minimum of special knowledge and
ability."" Liability will not lie for an "honest mistake of judgment,
where the proper course is open to reasonable doubts."" A physician
may be liable, however, for breach of contract where he promises to
cure his patient, or warrants to accomplish a particular result, but does
not succeed. 3 The same holds true for a hospital."
Causation in fact and proximate cause are two terms which have
given rise to some confusion regarding liability for negligence. Causation in fact is a question for the trier of fact." Liability will not attach
to conduct where "an act or an omission is not regarded as a cause of
7 6
an event if the particular event would have occurred without it."1
This "but for" requirement for liability is, however, flexibly applied in
situations where the defendant's conduct violated a statutory duty, and
the injury suffered was that which the care required of the defendant
was intended to prevent."
The issue of proximate cause arises only after causation in fact is
established. It is a question of law. The focus of the proximate cause
inquiry is whether the purposes of recognizing liability are served by
holding a defendant legally responsible for what his acts have in fact
caused.
The determination of proximate cause and causation in fact can be
better understood by examining the circumstances and results in two
different cases. In the first case liability attached to conduct; in the second case it did not.
South Highlands Infirmary v. Camp" involved an instrument, a
Stryker Dermatome, used to remove skin in grafting operations. The
springs controlling the depth-setting adjustment were bent, making the
71. PROSSER, supra note 67, § 32 at 162.
72. Id. Thus, disagreement in the medical field over the use of an apnea or cardiac monitor will not raise a question of legal liability regarding the choice of monitor,
providing there are no accepted indications suggesting that one type of monitor will be
better in a given situation. The courts will recognize that there "are areas in which even
experts will disagree. Where there are different schools of medical thought, it is held
that the dispute cannot be settled by the law, and the physician is entitled to be judged
according to the tenents of the school he professes to follow." Id. at 163.
73. Hawkins v. McGee, 84 N.J. 114, 146 A. 641 (1929), 40 AM. JUR. 2d Hospitals
and Asylums § 26 (1968).
74. 40 AM. JUR. 2d Hospitals and Asylums § 26 (1968).
75. PROSSER, supra note 67, § 41 at 237.
76. Id. at 238.
77. Id. at 242.
78. PROSSER, supra note 67, § 42 at 244.
79. 279 Ala. 1, 180 So. 2d 904 (1965).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol5/iss2/2

19801

SIDS: LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

instrument defective and useless. As a result, two skin patches removed from the patient's thigh were too thick to use and had to be resutured at the point of removal, resulting in permanent scars. The
hospital was found negligent for failing to inspect the instrument for
defects. Causation in fact was proven in that the plaintiff would not
have suffered the injury, but for the defective condition of the instrument. The court determined that the infirmary should be held to a duty
to inspect the instrument, in order to protect the plaintiff and others
like her against the type of injury suffered.80 The rationale underlying
the creation of the duty was sufficient for a finding that the injury proximately resulted from, or was proximately caused by, breach of such
duty.
In Huffmon v. Lindquist,8 ' a person suffered a fractured skull and
later, after emergency treatment at a hospital, died from a blood clot
in the lungs. Evidence at trial revealed that the first two pulmotors
called for by attending doctors did not function and the patient died
shortly after a third unit started to operate. The hospital was found
not to be liable. The court "conceded that failure to have the machines
in working order might constitute actionable negligence under some
circumstances, but there was no evidence that such failure was the proximate cause of the boy's death-that the boy would have lived if the
first two pulmotors had worked." 8 Death resulted from the blood clot
and not from the hospital's alleged negligence. Thus, although the
court employed proximate cause language, the result was dictated
because there was no causal connection, in fact, between the hospital's
83
conduct and the death.
But this argument has several weaknesses. First, it appears to rest
on legal pedantry. The position flirts with liability as courts are more
broad-minded in regards to a causal connection between the conduct
and the injury where the conduct violated a legal duty. Moreover, with
respect to home monitoring, the purpose of a pulmotor must be differentiated from that of an apnea monitor in the situations presented.
A pulmotor is designed to force air into the lungs. It has nothing to do
with detecting blood clots. An apnea monitor, on the other hand, is
specifically designed to detect prolonged apnea. It stands in a closer
relationship to what may be a significant factor leading to death than
does a pulmotor. Also, reliance upon such an argument is unnecessary.
80. Id.
81. 37 Cal. 2d 465, 234 P.2d 34 (1951).
82. 37 Cal. 2d at 480, 234 P.2d at 44.
83. Id.
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Checking an apnea monitor to see if it is functioning properly is a simple task. All one has to do is break the connection and wait for the
alarm to sound. Furthermore, once the machine is placed in the home,
the parents take over this job of checking the monitor by the same easy
procedure." Thus, the nature of the apnea monitor itself makes it
relatively easy and routine for a hospital to meet its duty of exercising
reasonable care in inspecting and maintaining its equipment. In meeting this duty, a hospital avoids potential liability."m
B. Warranty
A plaintiff has an advantage in suing on a warranty theory8 6 rather
than on negligence in that he is not required to prove that the defendant was at fault in breaching a warranty. Whether or not the defendant failed to exercise that degree of care the law requires is irrelevant.
In order to recover, the plaintiff need only prove that the product was
defective at the time of sale to him; that the product was either not fit
or not merchantable87due to the defect; and the injury was a proximate
result of the defect.
Warranty and strict liability in tort overlap to some extent.
84. The operational manual for Airshields also has a troubleshooting guide to aid
in ensuring that the machine is operating properly.
85. Kyslinger v. United States, 406 F. Supp. 800 (W.D. Pa. 1975) was the only
case found dealing specifically with hospital training for in-home use of a machine. It
involved a home hemodialysis unit. Training was held to be adequate, based upon
negligence principles. The training itself involved ten months of bi-weekly sessions until the hospital was satisfied that the party was capable of handling the unit at home.
86. This section regarding warranties refers only to implied warranties or warranties recognized in law irrespective of the express understanding of the parties. See notes
73-74 and accompanying text supra.
Implied warranties are covered by the Uniform Commercial Code under sections
2-314 and 2-315. Pertinent parts provide:
§ 2-314. Implied Warranty: Merchantability
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods
shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as... (c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used;
§ 2-315. Implied Warranty: Fitness for Particular Purpose
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the
seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under the next section an implied warranty that the goods shall
be fit for such purpose.
U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315 (1972 version).
87. Swartz, Product Liability: Manufacturer's Responsibility for Defective or
Negligently Designed Medical and Surgical Instruments, 18 DEPAUL L. REV. 348, 360
(1969).
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Theoretically, the same facts will suggest both a breach of implied warranty and strict liability. 8 But resistance by the courts to application of
either warranty theory or strict liability in medical controversies is
substantial. Of the two theories, the differences that do exist make
warranty theory a less appropriate vehicle for overcoming judicial
reluctance. Warranties, being embodied in the Uniform Commercial
Code, are intimately associated with the concept of a bargained sale
and the buyer-seller relationship. Technical requirements of notice,
disclaimer, and reliance, 8 9 make warranties a less attractive theory for
plaintiff use when compared with the consumer oriented theory of
strict liability in tort.
Nonetheless, warranty theory may be available for use in contexts
other than the usual bargained sale. Harper and James favor warranty
theory application in any situation where it is consistent with the
policies underlying warranty. 90 They identify these policies as being
met whenever one party is in a better position than the other party:
1) to know the antecedents that affect ... the quality of the thing...
dealt with; 2) to control those antecedents; 3) and to distribute losses
which occur because the thing has a dangerous quality; 4) when that
danger is not ordinarily to be expected; 5) so that other parties will be
likely to assume its absence and therefore refrain from taking selfprotective care.91
The Uniform Commercial Code also makes it clear that it was not intended to restrict the use of warranties only to normal sale situations.
Comment 2 to § 2-313 states:
Although this section is limited in its scope and direct purpose to warranties made by the seller to the buyer as part of a contract for sale, the warranty sections of this Article are not designed in any way to disturb those
lines of case law growth which have recognized that warranties need not
be confined either to sales contracts or to the direct parties to such a contract. They may arise in other appropriate circumstances ...
[T]he matter is left to the case law with the intention that the policies of
this Act may offer useful guidance in dealing with further cases as they
arise.'2
93
Analogies from sales to 'non-sale' transactions have been drawn,'
88.

Annot., 54 A.L.R.3d 258, 262 (1973).

89.

See generally, U.C.C. §§ 2-316, 2-605, 2-606, 2-607, 2-315, 2-711, 2-715 (1972

version).
2 HARPER & JAMES, LAW OF TORTS § 28.19, 1576 (1956).
91. Id.
92. U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 2 (1972 version).
93. See, e.g., Fakboury v. Magner, 25 Cal. App. 3d 58 (1972) (landlord of furnished apartment liable for defective furniture); Martin v. Tyder Truck Rental, Inc.,
90.

-

Del.

-,

353 A.2d 581 (1976).
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including the application of implied warranty theory in rental situations."4 Similar efforts in the medical field, however, have not been
successful. The courts have displayed a marked reluctance to find a
sale in medical situations where an identifiable good changes hands in
connection with medical services. The unwillingness of the courts
makes it unlikely that the rental of monitors will also be analogized to
a sale in order to give a plaintiff a warranty action against a hospital
concerning its home monitoring program.
For example, in Dorfman v. Austenal, Inc. and Cutler v. General
Electric Co.,9 6 complaints alleging a breach of warranty in the "sale"
of devices used during treatment did not state a cause of action against
the physician or hospital. Dorfman involved the insertion of a surgical
pin as part of the medical treatment, while Cutler concerned the, implantation of a pacemaker. Both cases relied upon Perlmutter v. Beth
David Hospital,9" with Cutler also citing Dorfman for support. Essentially, the cases held that no sale was involved. The instrument in each
case was only supplied incidentally with the treatment and care of the
patient. The use of the instrument did not give rise to a buyer-seller
relationship, even though the patient was charged for the item. The
primary reason for engaging a hospital and doctor is medical care and
the treatment of the patient. The defendants were not viewed as being
in the business of selling surgical appliances, and were, therefore, not
considered to be in a position to warrant each item's performance. 98
The plaintiff fared only slightly better in Cheshire v. Southhampton Hospital Association."9 This case involved a breach of warranty
against a hospital, with an allegation that the hospital had sold plaintiff a defective intramedullary pin which broke in his leg. The complaint was sufficient in stating a cause of action, as it "might be possible to prove a sale as opposed to an overall services contract."'"0 The
94. Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769
(1965).
95. 3 U.C.C.R.S. 856 (N.Y. Supp. 1966).
96. 4 U.C.C.R.S. 300 (N.Y. Supp. 1967).
97. 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954) (finding no sale in blood furnished by
hospital for patient's transfusion).
98. 3 U.C.C.R.S. at 857; 4 U.C.C.R.S. at 301. Dorfman quotes Perlmutter, 308
N.Y. at 104, 123 N.E.2d at _ : "It has long been recognized that when service
predominates, and transfer of personal property is but an incidental feature of the
transaction, the transaction is not deemed a sale within the Sales Act .

. .

. '[A] con-

tract of sale is not constituted merely by reason that the property in the materials is to
be transferred .... If they are simply accessory to work and labour, the contract is for
work, labour and materials ...... '
d. (citations omitted).

99. 53 Misc. 2d 355, 278 N.Y.S.2d 531 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
100. Id.
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court proceeded to note, however, the heavy burden the plaintiff
would face in proving a sale. Citing Perlmutter as authority, Cheshire
added that "a transaction involving medical care and treatment of a
patient at a hospital is regarded in its entirety, and may not be broken
down so as to label some parts of it as sales and others as contracts for
The restoration of a patient's health makes the whole conservices." 10,
tract one for services. Warranty theory is inapplicable to an isolated
medical treatment on the basis that such part was
part of the patient's
102
sale.
a warranted
But in Butler v. Northwestern Hospital of Minneapolis,' 3 a plaintiff did prevail in a suit against a hospital under an implied warranty
theory. The case involved a medical clamp that failed to function properly, causing the patient to be scalded by hot water. The opinion states
that "[o]ne furnishing an instrument for a special use or service impliedly warrants the article to be reasonably fit and suitable for the
purpose."'' 0 Closer examination of the court's decision, however,
reveals extensive ' reliance upon negligence principles. The wrong type
of clamp was employed for the task to be accomplished. This suggests
active neglect on the part of the hospital rather than simply use of a
defective good.' The court also indicated that the hospital breached
its duty to inspect equipment, noting that if a reasonable inspection
had been made the character of the clamp would likely have been
found.' 0 6 Finally, the court said that there was sufficient evidence of
0
hospital neglect to support a verdict finding the hospital liable.'1
8
The English case of iDodd v. Wilson' permitted recovery for
defective materials furnished as part of a service contract in a medical
situation. A veterinary surgeon was held liable for injuries resulting
from a defective serum he had purchased and injected into the plaintiff's cattle. It was held that there existed an implied condition that the
defendant would furnish a substance reasonably fit for its intended
purpose. The court reasoned that if the plaintiff had purchased the
serum himself, he might have recovered on a warranty theory against
the seller. The court saw no reason why the result should not be the
same when the material was furnished as part of a service.
53 Misc. 2d at 356, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 532.

101.
102.
103.

Id.

104.

202 Minn. at

202 Minn. 282, 278 N.W. 37 (1938).
-,

278 N.W. at 39.

105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. Indeed, Butler is often cited for the proposition that where "a patient ...
because of such defective equipment suffers injury proximately resulting therefrom,
liability can be imposed as for negligence." See, e.g., 41 C.J.S. Hospitals § 8 (1944).
108. [1946] 2 All E.R. 691.
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The same reasoning appears in a nonmedical context in Newmark
v. Gimbel's Inc. 0 9 The court held a beauty parlor operator liable for
breach of an implied warranty of fitness for damage caused from a
product applied to the plaintiff's scalp. The court based its decision
upon a number of grounds. Any sale-service distinction here was artificial; certainly, the defendant would have been subject to an implied
warranty of fitness if she had sold the product for use in the home.III
Other considerations favoring recognition of a warranty included: (1)
the defendant held herself out as possessing adequate knowledge and
skill that the products she used were reliable and not harmful; (2) the
plaintiff relied upon the defendant in this situation; and (3) the
operator controlled and supervised the treatment."'
In Newmark, the defendant contended that Magrine v. Krasnica,"2
in which a patient was injured by a dentist's defective hypodermic needle, was controlling. It was argued that, like the dentist in Magrine, the
beauty parlor operator was a professional, the transaction was a service contract, and therefore, did not involve any implied warranty of
goods. The Newmark court rejected the analogy equating a beauty
parlor operator to a dentist. The court noted many differences between
the cases including: (1) Magrine concerned professional services of
health and life, while a beauty parlor operator dealt in the nonequivalent servicing of cosmetics; (2) a medical professional's performance is not mechanical because each patient requires individual examination in order to diagnose the problem and to decide the course of
treatment needed; (3) neither medicine nor dentistry is an exact
science-no implied warranty of cure or relief can exist; (4) there is no
representation of infallibility by medical professionals and no guaranty
that a diagnosis is correct; (5) a physician's primary engagement is to
furnish services in the form of an opinion regarding a patient's condition based upon his medical experience and the years of study and
preparation spent to attain a license; and (6) a physician's unique
status and importance to the general welfare precludes recognition of
all liability standards save malpractice." 3
109. 102 N.J. Super. 279, 246 A.2d 11 (1968), aff'd 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697
(1969). This case was decided primarily on principles of strict liability.
110. 54 N.J. at 593-94, 258 A.2d at 700.
111. Id. at 593-94, 258 A.2d at 701.
112. 94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539, aff'd sub nom. Magrine v. Spector, 100
N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637, aff'd mem., 53 N.J. 259, 250 A.2d 129 (1967). Magrine
is treated at length, herein, under strict liability. See notes 146-55, 174-86 and accompanying text infra.
113. 54 N.J. at 596-97, 258 A.2d at 701-02. The court noted that the beauty
operator does not have to bear the full loss, presumably having an action against the
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol5/iss2/2
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In summary, the courts have consistently held to the following rationale when refusing to apply an implied warranty theory in medical
care and the treatment of the patient. The essence of the relationship is
the provision of professional service. Such transaction is regarded in its
entirety and is not to be broken down into various components. Supplying an instrument or a device in the course of treatment is only incidental to the service. No buyer-seller relationship is created. The
nature of medicine is inexact with decisional problems existing even in
apparently routine situations. Thus, not only is medical service properly distinguishable from normal sale of goods, but it is also distinguishable from routine commercial services, wherein liability might lie
for furnishing defective goods incidental to the service.
A hospital-run home monitoring program easily fits within the rationale of these cases. The task force report on the program"', repeatedly emphasizes a medical services approach to the operation. It
stresses the importance of round-the-clock surveillance, the need for
skilled personnel, and an extensive support system in carrying out such
undertaking. As for the necessity and significance of the mechanical
monitor which normally accompanies the device package, the report is
unclear. Monitors "may be useful adjuncts"' in surveillance, but the
report does not consider monitors to be a vital part of the program.
The general caveats embodied in the report also weigh against the
application of an implied warranty theory when a mechanical monitor
is furnished. What is known about SIDS is at best sketchy, and it must
be recognized that no guarantee of success can be given regarding such
a program with or without mechanical monitors. To apply a warranty
theory against a hospital in such situation merely because the hospital
chooses to employ monitors as part of its program might chill progressive development in the home monitoring technique.
But problems still remain concerning the inapplicability of warranty theory to a hospital-run home monitoring program. Such problems are suggested by the Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital" I decision, which refused to extend an implied warranty to blood, and the
Harper and James's policy considerations"' and Dodd v. Wilson,",
each advocating implied warranties.
manufacturer who was primarily responsible for placing the product into the stream of
commerce. Id. at 601, 258 A.2d 705.
114. See notes 56-58 supra.
115. Task Force on Prolonged Apnea, American Academy of Pediatrics, Prolonged Apnea, 61 PEDIATRICS 651 (1978). See note 56 supra.
116. 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
117. 2 HARPER & JAMES, LAW OF TORTS § 28.19, 1576 (1956). See notes 90-91 and
accompanying text supra.
118. [1946] 2 All E.R. 691. See note 108 supra.
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First, as indicated above, at least three cases" 9 resort to the
Perlmutter rationale in order to preclude warranty theory application.
The problem with relying on Perlmutteris that its approach has been
extensively criticized and presently stands as questionable authority.
Farnsworth' 20 essentially equates a contract for services with incidentally furnished goods to a sale of the goods.' 2 ' He notes that although
much of a restaurant's contract involves service, the weight of authority has labelled such contracts as sales of goods in part and imposed a
warranty of fitness for consumption on the food served.' 2 2 Furthermore, Farnsworth cites three cases which have found an implied war23
ranty without explicitly finding any sale.'
Farnsworth is somewhat critical of Perlmutter's finding that a
blood transfusion is not a sale. His primary dispute with the decision,
however, is the failure of the court to consider the possible application
of an implied warranty despite the absence of a sale.' 2 He sees reliance
as the essential requirement for application of a warranty in a given
situation, and such reliance is clearly present in blood transfusions. He
also faults Perlmutter for concluding that if there was a sale of blood,
the inability of the hospital to detect impurities, absent a showing of
negligence, saves the hospital from liability. Because warranty theory
parallels strict liability at least to this extent, inability to detect impurities is not a pertinent factor in deciding whether a warranty theory
should apply. Moreover, "the imposition of liability will not only
distribute the loss but may well accelerate the search for and development of techniques for the discovery and prevention of such
2
defects.' 1
Perlmutter has also been criticized in the cases. In Cunningham v.
MacNeal Memorial Hospital,'26 for example, the court faced a similar
119. Dorfman v. Austenal, Inc., 3 U.C.C.R.S. 856 (N.Y. Supp. 1966); Cutler v.
General Electric Co., 4 U.C.C.R.S. 300 (N.Y. Supp. 1967); Chesire v. South Hampton
Hosp. Assoc., 53 Misc. 2d 355, 278 N.Y.S.2d 531 (Sup. Ct. 1967). See notes 95-102
supra.
120. Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality inNon-Sales Cases, 57 COL. L.
REV.

653 (1953).

121. Id. at 660.
122. Id. at 662. This position has been incorporated into the U.C.C. under section
2-314 as an implied warranty of merchantability. The last sentence of the first subsection reads: "Under this section the serving for value of food or drink to be consumed
either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale."
123. Amdal v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 84 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Iowa 1949); Cliett v.
Lauderdale Biltmore Corp., 39 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 1949); Sartin v. Blackwell, 200 Miss.
579, 28 So. 2d 222 (1946); Farnsworth, supra note 120, at 662 n. 62.
124. Farnsworth, supra note 120, at 662.
125. Id. at 672.
126. 47 Ill. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970).
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situation but reached a result opposed to Perlmutter. Holding that a
hospital was indeed engaged in the business of "selling" blood when
giving transfusions, the Perlmutter approach was specifically
rejected. 27
The criticism directed at Perlmutter, however, is undercut by the
action of a number of state legislatures essentially enacting the
Perlmutter holding. Illinois, wherein Cunningham was decided, is
most notable among the states which have declared by statute that
blood transfusions do not constitute a sale of blood. 2 ' Moreover, to
the extent that it pertains to unavoidably unsafe products and strict
liability, the Restatement of Torts also appears by analogy to lend support to the Perlmutterresult.'2 9 In pertinent part, the Restatement excepts as a basis of liability the sale of products "which, in the present
state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for
their intended and ordinary use." 3 ' Blood transfusions appear to fall
within this exclusion.
Second, Harper and James, in favoring the extension of warranty
theory beyond the sales area,' 3 ' failed to explicitly suggest limitations
on such extension. Nonetheless, as noted by the court in Magrine v.
Krasnica,3 the policy considerations supporting extension are set
forth in the Harper and James treatise under a section entitled "Liability of Suppliers of Chattels." If hospitals are not considered to be suppliers, then the suggested policy considerations should not apply to
their operation of monitoring programs. In other words, the extension
of warranty theory is implicitly limited by the context. Further, application of the policy considerations would not necessarily result in
recognition of an implied warranty with respect to monitoring. A
127.

47 Ill. 2d at 450-52, 266 N.E.2d at 901.

128. The Illinois statute declares it to be public policy to limit legal liability to
negligence or willful misconduct in blood transfusion situations. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
91, § 181 (Smith-Hurd). The annotation at Annot., 45 A.L.R.3d 1364 (1972), lists the
states having said that furnishing blood is not a sale, but only an incidental feature of
services rendered: Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin and West Virginia. Jurisdictions holding
that strict liability does not apply to a hospital in this context include: California, Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Ohio,
Oklahoma and Tennessee.
129. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF-TORTS § 402A, Comment k (1965).
130. Id.
131. See notes 90-91 and accompanying text supra.
132. 94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539 (1967), aff'd sub nom.Magrine v. Spector,
100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (1968), aff'd 53 N.J. 259, 250 A.2d 125 (1969).
Magrine is treated at length under strict liability. See notes 146-55, 174-80 and accompanying text infra.
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hospital is not in a better position than the parents in a properly run
monitoring program. In order to be adequately prepared to handle any
crisis that may arise with home monitoring by machine, the parents
will be made aware of all aspects and problems involved in the program, including the reliability of a monitoring machine. Being so informed, it cannot be said that the parents relied on the superior
knowledge or position of the sponsoring hospital. As indicated above,
the absence of reliance is a proper criteria in determining whether to
recognize an implied warranty.33
Finally, the decision in Dodd v. Wilson, 3 " extending warranty
theory in a medical situation, presents a more serious obstacle.
Magrine distinguished Dodd stating "that not only were services involved but the defective products were also supplied by the defendants
to the plaintiffs.""' But without a further explanation of facts
supporting the conclusion that the veterinary surgeon was a supplier, a
distinction based on the relationship between the parties seems weak.
Nonetheless, even with application of Dodd to a monitoring program,
it appears enough to say that the casual relation between a defective
monitor's failure and expected injury, without more, should not be
sufficient to justify a Dodd result. In Dodd, the good used in rendering
service precipitated the injury. A defective monitor does not bring
about death, but only fails to signal the opportunity to prevent it.",
C. Strict Liability in Tort
"Strict liability is the imposition of liability without fault upon
sellers of defective products. Proof of negligence is not essential to im-

133. See, text accompanying note 91 supra (especially fifth item); see also, text accompanying notes 124-25 supra. None of the five points Harper and James mention
pass muster here. The parents are approximately in the same position as the hospital
regarding the monitor's past history because of the availability of a record of past users
and maintenance checks. The distribution of loss consideration is qualified in that it is
only applicable where an element of danger is present. The monitor does not possess a
"dangerous quality." A monitor may prove to be defective in the sense it will not
detect prolonged apnea, but there is no danger from the machine because of this
defect. It will merely be inoperative. The problem comes from what the machine is failing to detect. Because parents will be informed of a monitor's shortcomings, the problems a monitor might present will not be unexpected.
134. [1946] 2 All E.R. 691. See note 108 supra.
135. 97 N.J. Super. at 236, 227 A.2d at 544.
136. This is with respect to a monitor's failure to detect an apneic episode with
death following. The causal relation is stronger, of course, in situations where an infant is injured by the machine, e.g., he receives a severe shock. In any event, this does
not mean that the nexus is insufficient to support causation and liability in negligence.
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pose liability and the lack of it is immaterial. ' ' 3 7 The policies underlying the imposition of strict liability include:
1)public interest in the utmost safety of products; 2) demand for maximum protection of the consumer; 3) implied assurance in placing the
goods on the market for use; 4) consumer's reliance on the apparent safety
of the product; 5) the fact that the consumer is the seller's ultimate objective; and 6) the desirability of avoiding
circuity of action and allowing
1 38
direct recovery against earlier sellers.
It has also been said that the application of strict liability in a given
situation is a simple policy decision, with the sole issue being "when
39
and to whom a loss should be shifted.'1
Strict liability, although having much in common with warranty
theory, is unencumbered by the burdens and requirements associated
with warranties. As a consumer oriented policy, strict liability is unaffected by such considerations as buyer reliance or disclaimers which
are associated with warranties and the commercial sphere."10 Thus,
strict liability is more appropriate than warranty theory for application to a hospital-run home monitoring program.
137. [1974] 1 PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 4000. A recognized definition of strict
liability is found in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965):

Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1)applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
138. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN.
L. REv. 791, 816 (1966) [hereinafter cited as The Citadel].
139. Keeton, Products Liability-Some Observations About Allocation of Risks,
64 MICH. L. REv. 1329, 1331 (1966).
140.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A,

Comment m, states that reliance,

as used in strict liability, is not the consumer's reliance "upon the reputation, skill, or
judgment of the seller ....nor any representation or undertaking on the part of that
seller." Reliance, for purposes of strict liability, is derived from the simple fact that a
product has been put into the stream of commerce and promotes certain expectations
in the market place.
Other differences between strict liability and warranty noted by Comment m include: 1)strict liability is not affected by the U.C.C. provisions limiting the scope and
content of warranties; 2) the U.C.C.'s use of the terms 'buyer' and 'seller' does not affect strict liability; 3) strict liability requires no notice; 4) privity is not an issue in strict
liability; and 5) a consumer is not affected by any disclaimer or agreement made between a seller and his immediate buyer when suing on a strict liability theory.
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The scope of strict liability is expanding and, like warranties, has
been held to encompass leasing.'" Although strict liability has made
minor inroads into medical situations,' 2 the courts have drawn the line
and have refused to "impose strict liability on one who was not in
some way related to the production and marketing process."'" Strict
liability in tort has not yet been applied against a hospital or physician
for injuries related to a drug, medical instrument, or similar device used
in treating a patient.'4 " Advocates of such application have been either
ignored or criticized." 5 Although there have been only a few cases
dealing with the question of strict liability in this context, the decisions
indicate that application of strict liability will not be forthcoming.
Magrine v. Krasnica' 6 involved a patient's action against her dentist for injuries caused by a defective hypodermic needle which broke
while in her jaw. Negligence was not alleged. The court went beyond
the sale-service distinction and considered the policies underlying strict
liability in tort. After an extensive review of various authorities, and
noting the important role New Jersey had played in expanding strict
liability,"' the court concluded that strict liability should not be applied.
The court decided that the dentist was not in a better position than
the plaintiff to control, inspect and discover the latent defect in the
needle. It recognized the import of Harper and James's warranty
theory considerations,' 8 but distinguished the term "better position"
as used therein from its use in New Jersey case law. "[I]n all of our re141. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960); Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965); Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc.,
102 N.J. Super. 279, 246 A.2d 11 (1968), aff'd 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969).
Newmark involved both warranties and strict liability claims. See also Cintrone v.
Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965)'. Cintrone, like
Newmark, was brought on both warranty and strict liability grounds.
142. See, e.g., Johnson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 355 F. Supp. 1065 (E.D. Wis.
1973); Rose v. Hakim, 335 F. Supp. 1221 (D.C.C. 1971). See notes 166-73 and accompanying text infra.
143. Wecht, Legal Medicine: An Historical Review and Future Perspective, 22
N.Y.L. SCH. L. Rv. 873 (1977).
144. Annot., 54 A.L.R.3d 258, 261 (1973).
145. See Swartz, supra note 87, at 351, which criticizes similar advocacy found at
Cox, The Medical Profession and Strict Liability for Defective Products-A Limited
Extension, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 359 (1965), and 1967 WASH. U.L.Q. 322, for not
recognizing the manufacturer as a defendant in a medical suit.
146. 94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539 (1967), aff'd sub nom. Magrine v. Spector,
100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (1968), affd mem. 53 N.J. 259, 250 A.2d 129
(1969).
147. See note 141 supra.
148. See text accompanying note 91 supra.
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cent cases strict liability was imposed . . . upon those who were in a
better position in the sense that they created the danger (in making the
article . . .), or possessed a better capacity or expertise to control, inspect and discover the defect . . . than the party injured."' 9 The dentist was not in a better position than the plaintiff because he neither
"created the defect nor possessed any better capacity or expertise to
discover or correct it than she."' 5 ° Furthermore, strict liability was
held applicable in the earlier New Jersey cases "for the essentially basic
reason that those so held liable put the product 'in the stream of trade
and promote its purchase by the public.'"' The dentist performed
neither of these functions.
The plaintiff also contended that "risk distribution" theory applied here.' 2 The dentist could protect himself by insurance or by impleading his supplier or the manufacturer. The court recognized that
this approach had some merit, but determined that it was not dispositive in view of other considerations.
The court noted that the dentist was not the type of defendant normally contemplated in the risk distribution theory. Earlier New Jersey
cases applying the theory involved defendants who were assumed to
possess the size and contacts necessary for broad distribution of risk
with minimum adverse effects. Moreover, allocation of risk by insurance has its limits:
149. 97 N.J. Super. at 234, 227 A.2d at 543. A "retailer exception," omitted from
the quotation, is treated at note 15, infra.
150. Id.
151. The retail dealer selling food in a sealed container and having no opportunity
to inspect the goods, was distinguished upon different grounds. Certainly, the retailer
is in no better position than the dentist to discover the defect but the retailer may be
subject to strict liability while the dentist is not. The court noted that the legislature
had already made a policy decision regarding this situation in enacting the U.C.C.,
which extends to retail sales. The court also noted that in fact several courts have
refused to impose a warranty on the 'innocent' retailer when he lacks the means to
discover the defect. See also 2 HARPER & JAMES, note 117 supra, § 28.30 at 1600.

The court, however, placed more emphasis upon the fact that the essence of the
transaction between the retail seller and the consumer relates to the article sold. The
seller is in the business of supplying the product to the consumer. It is that, and that
alone, for which he is paid. A dentist or a physician offers, and is paid for, his professional services and skill. That is the essence of the relationship with his patient. 227
A.2d at 543. This is the rationale the court also used in accepting the Perlmutter decision. See also note 129 supra.
152. The risk distribution theory is implicit in strict liability doctrine. The idea is to
spread the loss along the chain of distribution so that each participant will bear only a
minimal cost, instead of one participant bearing the full cost of compensating for the
loss. Essentially, the loss becomes a cost of doing business which, at least in part, is
passed on to the relevant class of consumers.
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What insurance can do, of course, is to distribute losses proportionately
among a group who are to bear them. What it cannot do and should not
do is to determine whether the group should bear them in the first instance-and whether, for example, consumers shall be compelled to accept substantial price increases on everything they buy in order to compensate others for their misfortunes. Even the distribution of the losses
'
through insurance may be a process that has its flaws.

Permitting the dentist to implead the manufacturer also had
limited validity. The dentist would merely be a conduit, channeling the

loss to where it rightfully belonged. But the court viewed resort to this
technique as a "make weight" argument,'" finding a better approach
in the plaintiff's use of discovery procedures to identify the manufacturer and sue him directly."'
Although Magrine involved a dentist as defendant, its reasoning
56
and analysis were extended in Silverhart v. Mt. Zion Hospital' to in-

clude medical institutions. Silverhartinvolved a defective surgical needle
which had broken while inserted in the plaintiff during an operation.
The plaintiff brought suit upon strict liability grounds, naming the
hospital as the supplier of the defective product which caused injury.

The court, after examining the history of strict liability and the significant part California played in developing the doctrine,'" held that this
theory did not apply. The policies underlying strict liability did not

justify its application to the medical profession.
Quoting Magrine as authority, the Silverhart court stated that a
15
hospital's primary function is to provide medical services, not sales.
153. 227 A.2d at 545, quoting Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel(Strict liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1022, 1121 (1960).
154. 227 A.2d at 546.
155. Id. At the time of trial, the identity of the manufacturer was unknown.
Despite this fact, the court was willing to deny plaintiff's suit against the dentist, leaving the plaintiff out in the cold should the identity of the manufacturer never be uncovered. The court said it would be a rare case in which the manufacturer could not be
identified. This manufacturer identity problem became moot by the time the case
reached the appellate level. By then, the supplier and manufacturer had been identified
and impleaded by the dentist.
156. 20 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 98 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1971).
157. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697, 377 P.2d 897 (1963). Greenman preceded the Second Restatement of Torts by two
years, but, in not requiring that the product be "unreasonably dangerous to the user",
Greenman goes further than the position adopted by the Restatement. See note 137
supra. It only requires that the product in question be defective. California reaffirmed
this difference in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olsen Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 501
P.2d 1153 (1972). Cronin decided that requiring the defect to be unreasonably
dangerous unduly burdened a plaintiff with proof of an element which carried an overtone of negligence.
158. 20 Cal. App. 3d at 1026, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 190.
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"The essence of the relationship between a hospital and patients does
not relate essentially to any product or piece of equipment it uses but
to the professional services it provides."' 59 The expansion of strict
liability beyond manufacturers in other contexts' 60 was based on a
common element, in that each defendant to which strict liability was
held applicable had "played an integral and vital part in the overall
production or marketing enterprise. At the very least, the defendant in
each case was a link in the chain of getting goods from the manufacturer to the ultimate user or consumer.'" "' This distributive chain ended
when the hospital obtained the needle. The needle became part of the
hospital's surgical equipment, making the hospital the "user" of the
needle. Therefore, the principles of Section 402A of the Second
Restatement of Torts, which embodies strict liability, simply did not
apply to the facts." 2
In Carmichaelv. Reitz, ' cited by Silverhartin support of its view,
the court rejected the application of strict liability against a physician
who injected the plaintiff with a drug, causing complications. Grounds
for refusing to consider the physician as a retailer included: 1) the
distinction existing between a sale and service, especially when the services are those of a professional nature; and 2) the intermediary or
conduit character of a retailer which is distinguishable from the physician who "sells" his services as a healer, relying upon his training,
4
skill, judgment and experience."
In Vergott v. Deseret Pharmaceutical,"' a plaintiff sued the
hospital, supplier and manufacturer of a defective catheter which
broke while being inserted into the plaintiff's arm. Only the manufacturer was held liable at trial. An attempt to obtain indemnification or
contribution from the hospital and distributor failed. The court stated
that section 402A should not be applied to situations in which its ap159. Id. at 1026-27, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 190.
160. Affected groups mentioned by the court include retail dealers, homebuilders,
bailers and lessors of personal property, and licensors of chattels. Id. at 1026, 98 Cal.
Rptr. at 190.
161. Id.
162. The court emphatically rejected drawing any analogies from section 402A to
the situation here. Section 402A is concerned only with harm to the ultimate user of
the product. The hospital was held not to be a seller of the needles, but on the contrary
was the user.
163. 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1971).
164. 17 Cal. App. 3d at 978, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 393. A ready analogy can be drawn
from this case to a monitoring program. Carmichael states that "[t]he physician
prescribes the medicine in the course of chemotherapy only as a chemical aid or instrument to achieve a cure." Id. The same can be said for the apnea monitor.
165. 463 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1972).
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plication would effectively benefit the manufacturer who had made the
defective product. Even if Section 402A would be applied, the hospital
would not fall within its scope because the hospital was not a seller of
the defective product.
Johnson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 6I represents slight advance
toward application of strict liability in a medical controversy. The
court held that a hospital will be subject to strict liability in providing
mechanical and administrative services. With respect to professional
services, however, the court noted that
[T]o hold medical professionals strictly liable under these circumstances
would not promote any social benefit. In fact, if that standard were applied to doctors, it might make them reluctant to assume responsibility
for the treatment of patients, particularlywhen such treatmentinvolves a
developing area of medicine, which would work a serious social disservice. 167

Since the line between professional and nonprofessional services is
often blurred, the decision whether to impose strict liability in a given
situation must be made on an ad hoc basis.
The court rejected the idea of a hospial exemption from strict
liability when such exception is to be based solely upon fear that
hospital funds may be depleted. The court acknowledged that hospitals
are, in general, charitable institutions, but it sided with Cunningham v.
MacNeal Memorial Hospital,"' 8 in stating "we do not believe in this
present day and age, when the operation of eleemosynary hospitals
constitutes one of the biggest businesses in this country, that hospital
9
immunity can be justified on the protection-of-the-funds theory."'
166. 355 F. Supp. 1065 (E.D. Wis. 1973). The facts of this case are not entirely
clear. The plaintiff sued Sears for injuries received when a tire Sears installed fell off.
Sear impleaded the hospital which had treated plaintiff's injuries on both negligence
and strict liability grounds.
The force of this opinion is tempered somewhat by the fact that no Wisconsin state
court has yet heard a case involving application of strict liability to services. Thus, the
federal judge here was presumably deciding the issue in the manner it believed the
Wisconsin Supreme Court might have done so if the matter had come before it.
167. Id. at 1067 (emphasis added). The court based this conclusion on the rationale
that
[Miedical sciences are not exact. A patient cannot consider a doctor's treatment to
be defective simply because it does not cure his ailment. All that a doctor can be
expected to provide is adequate treatment commensurate with the state of medical
science. In other words, doctors do not contract with patients to provide cures but
rather to provide treatment in a non-negligent manner.

Id.

168. 47 Ill. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970). This case was overturned by the Illinois
state legislature. See notes 126-28 supra.
169. 355 F. Supp. at 1067, citing 266 N.E.2d at 904.
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To the extent that Johnson allowed strict hospital liability, the case
should have little impact upon a hospital-run monitoring program. Use
of the monitor comes within the professionl services category, being
part of the care and treatment that is provided for infants. Moreover,
although the court in Johnson never specifically indicated, the conduct
upon which liability was predicated appeared to relate to an admissions
error. The opinion only notes that it is vital that doctors "receive all
pertinent information accurately to determine if a particular course of
treatment is appropriate." 1 0 Use of a monitor on the other hand, is
not considered until long after the pertinent facts are known regarding
the infant.
Rose v. Hakim 7 ' has been cited as a case holding a hospital strictly
liable for use of defective equipment.' 7 2 But the facts of the case suggested consistent hospital practice relating to the use of defective
equipment which might have constituted negligence. The nursing staff
knew that a telethermometer had not always been accurate. The temperature chart on the machine was shown not to be in proper working
order. It also appeared that doctors' orders were not followed, including a consistent failure to deliver equipment when requested. '73 In
short, there was general neglect and the hospital breached its duty to
exercise reasonable care in inspecting, maintaining, and utilizing its
equipment. The plaintiff was injured as a direct result of this
negligence.
Arguments favoring the application of strict liability in medical
situations are eloquently stated by the dissent in Magrine v. Spector,' I
wherein strict liability was held inapplicable in an action against a
dentist for injury caused by a defective hypodermic needle. Judge Botter, writing in dissent, framed the issue as follows: "When an innocent
person is injured through the inadvertant conduct of another, who
75
should bear the loss?"'1
After examining the status of strict liability and negligence theory
170. 355 F. Supp. at 1067. Johnson can be viewed as generally enhancing a
hospital's position in sponsoring monitor programs, but it does not preclude the
possibility of strict liability being attached to some of its components.
171. 335 F. Supp. 1221 (D.D.C. 1971).
172. Wecht, supra note 143, at 873.
173. 335 F. Supp. at 1226.
174. 100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (1968), aff'd mern., 53 N.J. 259, 250 A.2d
125 (1969), aff'g Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539 (1967). See
notes 132, 146-55 and accompanying text supra.
175. 100 N.J. Super. at 226, 241 A.2d at 639 (Botter, J., dissenting). The judge
had already answered his question by noting that "[A]s between an innocent patient
and a dentist who causes injury by using a defective instrument the law should require
the loss to be borne by the dentist, even if he is not negligent."
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at different times in history, Judge Botter concludes that, as the objectives the law seeks to accomplish change so, too, do the means to attain these new ends. The dissent identified the current dominant objective to be "the need to compensate victims of normal conditions of
daily life."' 6 This end is evident from such changes in the law as the
elimination of privity requirements, the rise of actions on quality
representations, and the growth and expansion of strict liability. The
Supreme Court of New Jersey had said on other occasions that "social
justice," "enterprise liability," and "loss distribution" are the
primary principles underlying strict liability. 7 7
The dissent rejected the idea of determining whether strict liability
should apply on the basis of a defendant's ability to spread the loss.
"Strict liability applies to all manufacturers, big and small, and in
most states where the doctrine prevails it applies to retailers as well, big
and small.''' 7 8
Moreover, because the patient is the "consumer" of the needle,
and not the dentist, any risk of injury stemming from use of the needle
lies with the patient. Therefore, the reliance which the plaintiff placed
on the dentist justifies strict liability. The dentist was in a better position than the patient to choose the instrument and he is better able to
identify the manufacturer or supplier. The dentist is also better informed about an instrument's quality and the reliability of the supplier. Thus, although degree of care would not be an element of the
dentist's liability of strict liability were imposed upon him, the prevention of injury through the promotion of greater care in purchasing and
examining equipment, in order to reduce the number of instances of
liability, might be a resulting benefit in addition to victim compensation. 7 9
176. Id. at 229, 241 A.2d at 640.
177. Id. at 231, 241 A.2d at 641-42. The cases cited in support of each principle
are, respectively: Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 384, 161 A.2d
69, 83 (1960); Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 65-66, 207 A.2d 305,
312 (1965); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 446, 212
A.2d 769, 775 (1965).
178. 100 N.J. Super. at 232, 241 A.2d at 642.
179. Id. at 233, 235, 241 A.2d at 642, 644. The dissent's assertion that the application of strict liability may actually encourage inspections for latent defects does not go
unchallenged. Strict liability may very well lead to a relaxation of any sort of examinations. After all, why bother checking out an item in the first place if one knows that he
will be automatically liable should it be defective? Both Prosser and Keeton have expressed doubts as to whether strict liability induces greater precautions than does
negligence. See Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1119 (1960); Keeton, Products Liability-Some Observations About Allocation of Risks, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1329, 1333 (1965). Moreover, as
Keeton noted, "if strict liability does induce greater care, it can be argued that it will
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol5/iss2/2
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The dissenting opinion finally notes the seeming unfairness in saying that one is to pay for damages when he was not to blame. Judge
Botter believes, however, that
our sense of justice is better served by the principle that holds a dentist
accountable for injuries caused by a defective instrument which he has
selected and used. The risk of harm to which an innocent patient is exposed by a defective instrument far exceeds the risk of burden which the
dentist is asked to bear.'
V. CONCLUSION
When all is said and done, what it all comes down to is simply the
question Keeton posed: When and to whom should a loss be shifted?' 81
With the exception of Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital,8 2
which was overturned by the state legislature," 3 the courts have been
unanimous in answering Keeton's question, when presented in medical
situations, under negligence theory and without resort to concepts of
warranty or strict liability in tort.
The hospital-run home monitoring program for SIDS easily fits
within the ambit of the various cases examined. To the extent that the
situation regarding parents in a home monitoring program does differ
from that facing people in the usual medical circumstance, the differences favor limitation of liability upon negligence principles and
weigh against expansion upon warranty or strict liability. With the
parents being fully informed and playing an active part in the monitoring program, the element of reliance is not nearly as significant in the
home monitoring context as it might have been in the cases analyzed.
The fact that the setting is the home and not the hospital or a doctor's
office is also of no consequence. Location is an irrelevant consideration regarding whether strict liability or warranty should attach,
although whether a home is properly equipped may be a question of
negligence. Liability for defects in the elaborate support system, and
the training of parents concerning the monitor and cardiopulmonary
resuscitation, should also be judged by negligence standards, because
both pertain to the care and treatment of the patient and both are a

also tend to inhibit the development of new products. Thus, the importance of the
development of new products may be a factor to be considered in establishing the
limits of strict liability." Id. What is said here regarding products applies equally to
medical advances and new treatments.
180. 100 N.J. Super. at 235, 241 A.2d at 644.
181. See note 139 and accompanying text supra.
182. 44 Ill.
2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970). See text accompanying note 126 supra.
183. See note 127 supra.
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part of the professional services a hospital makes available upon
establishing an in-home monitoring program.
The decision whether an apnea monitor or a cardiac monitor is to
be used in a given situation, should be subject only to malpractice
claims. Medicine is an inexact science and this is especially true with its
understanding of SIDS. The decision regarding the type of monitor to
be used, if any at all, is one of a professional nature, based upon
knowledge, training, experience and skill. A doctor is not liable for an
"honest mistake of judgment, where the proper course is open to
reasonable doubts." 1 " A malpractice suit may properly arise regarding
the choice of monitor, however, if there were indications, based upon
the applicable professional standards of liability, that one monitor
would have clearly been the better choice."5
Whether negligence, warranty, or strict liability is applied to determine liability for a defective monitor once chosen, a problem may arise
in determining whether a sudden infant death subsequent to the monitor's failure was "caused" by that failure. Although, in general, policy
considerations do favor the limitation of medical liability upon principles of negligence, it does not follow that liability should be further
limited by pedantry on the elements of negligence. If liability is to be
determined in any event, it is suggested that the strict approach to
causation requirements in Huffmon v. Lindquist'" be loosened. Thus,
if a hospital is to be held liable for negligence in operating a home
monitoring program, it makes little sense to further limit liability
where a breach of the duty of care has been established, by a grudging
and restrictive determination on causation. If negligence is applicable,
it must be remembered that one goal is to encourage prudent conduct,
and this purpose is served by a flexible approach to causation.
But no benefit results from the imposition of liability upon a
hospital in situations where it is not at fault. Contrary to the dissent in
Magrine v. Spector,""'more is involved than simply two innocent parties consisting of the patient and the professional. The circumstances
also involve the manufacturer and supplier of any equipment which
the professional employs or recommends. The additional parties are
subject to liability upon warranty and strict liability theories. The

184. See notes 67-74 and accompanying text supra.
185. See notes 55-56 and accompanying text, and note 72 supra.
186. 37 Cal. 2d 465, 234 P.2d 34 (1951). See notes 81-85 and accompanying text
supra.
187. 100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (1968), aff'd mem. 53 N.J. 259, 250 A.2d
125 (1969), aff'g Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539 (1967). See
notes 132, 146-55, 174-80 and accompanying text supra.
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problem with the Magrine dissent is the same problem affecting many
attorneys-it is too narrow-minded concerning the scope of possible
litigants. No policy dilemma exists regarding a warranty or strict
liability suit against either the supplier or manufacturer or both. Use of
proper discovery procedures with respect to the hospital will easily
identify these parties, if the manufacturer's label on the monitor itself
does not.
The harm to society, if strict liability or warranty were to be applied to a hospital's home monitoring program, would be tremendous.
The application of these theories would essentially halt all development
in such programs and would, in addition, impair the development of
other new medical techniques which are presently in the experimental
stage. Upon consideration of all the circumstances-the nature of and
controversy surrounding SIDS and medical knowledge in general, as
well as the public policy concerns which favor the advancement of
medical knowledge and techniques-a hospital should only be subject
to liability upon principles of neglience regarding its operation of a
monitoring program.
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